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Abstract:  This paper analyses the pure time-series properties of doctors’ 
fees in Ireland to assess whether a structural change in the series is observed 
at the time of the change in reimbursement in 1989.  Such a break would be 
consistent with doctors responding to the reimbursement change in a manner 
predicted by supplier-induced-demand behaviour and would provide indirect 
evidence that such inducement had taken place.  Structural change is 
assessed on the basis of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests.  The data is also 
analysed for the presence of unusually influential observations.  In neither 
case are the results consistent with a break around the time of the 
introduction of the change. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In a recent paper Madden, Nolan and Nolan (2004, henceforth MNN) explored the 
extent to which visiting patterns to General Practitioners in Ireland changed following 
a change in reimbursement.  More specifically, in Ireland, individuals below an 
income threshold, termed “medical card patients”, are entitled to free GP 
consultations while the remainder of the population, termed “private patients”, must 
pay the full cost of each consultation.  Prior to 1989, GPs were reimbursed on a fee-
per-service basis for both medical card and private patients, by the State and the 
patient respectively. In part in response to evidence in favour of demand inducement 
presented by Tussing (1983, 1985), the reimbursement system for medical card 
patients was changed from fee-for-service to capitation in 1989, thus removing any 
incentive for GPs to induce visits from medical-card patients.  MNN examined the 
“difference-in-differences” between medical card and non-medical card visits before 
and after the change in reimbursement.  The results showed that the differential in 
visiting rates between medical-card holders and others did not narrow, as might have 
been anticipated if supplier induced demand played a major role. 
One factor which MNN were unable to take account of was whether, following 
the change in reimbursement, GPs increased their fees for private patients to offset 
any loss in induced demand from medical-card patients.  Failure to take account of 
this implies that some form of supplier-induced demand for medical card patients 
prior to 1989 cannot be unambiguously ruled out.  This is because while the change in 
reimbursement was introduced with the intention of lowering medical-card patients’   3
visits (and evidence suggests that it succeeded in this in the short-run at least), doctors 
may have responded to their loss of income from this form of inducement by raising 
fees for non-medical card patients.  If GP visits for non-medical patients are price 
inelastic, as is typically assumed, then such a course of action would have led to 
increased revenue from private patients, yet no narrowing of the visiting differential 
since visits from both groups would have fallen. 
Unfortunately MNN were unable to explicitly control for such an effect since their 
data listed GP visits on an annual basis (i.e. numbers per year for each individual) and 
so it was not possible to assign individual visits to the particular month or quarter.  In 
the absence of sufficient time variation it was not possible to condition on price in the 
analysis. 
In this note we utilise an alternative data source and approach to investigate the 
evolution of doctors’ fees over time.  In particular, we examine whether any form of 
break or discontinuity (we define precisely what we mean by this below) can be 
observed in the time-series data on doctors fees around the time the change in 
reimbursement was introduced.  If such a break is observed then it is consistent with 
doctors responding to the change in reimbursement by raising private patients’ fees.  
In turn this could be regarded as a classic reaction to a situation where inducement 
had previously existed, but where the scope for such inducement had been diminished 
by the change in reimbursement. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  In the next section we 
describe our data source and the methodology we employ to detect any break in the 
time-series on doctors’ fees.  In section 3 we present our results and in section 4 we 
offer concluding comments. 
   4
2.  Data and Methodology 
This section describes our data and methodology.  The data we use is quarterly 
data on doctors’ fees from 1983 Q1 to 2003 Q3 provided by the Irish Central 
Statistics Office.  This index is a sub-component of the overall Consumer Price Index.  
To obtain the change in the real price of doctors’ fees we deflate the index for 
doctors’ fees by the index for all items.  The graph below shows the change in the real 
price of doctors’ fees from 1983 to 2003 (indexed at 100 for 1983 Q1). 
 


















































































































































































Purely eye-balling the graph we see that doctors’ fees (in real terms) stayed 
constant from early 1983 to about the last quarter of 1985.  We then see the index start 
to increase and there is some evidence of a slight “blip” upwards in the first quarter of 
1989, but this seems to be followed by a levelling off for the rest of 1989.  From then 
on the rate of increase is reasonably constant (though there is some evidence that it   5
picks up around the end of 2000) with evidence of other occasional blips e.g. 1992 
Q1, 1999 Q1 and, in particular, 2002 Q1.  The fact that most of the blips occur in Q1 
may indicate some seasonality in price setting (i.e. GPs change their fees at the 
beginning of every year) and the particularly large rise in 2002 Q1 may reflect the 
changeover to the euro.
1  We return to this below. 
While eye-balling the data can be revealing in terms of suggesting possible 
breaks, it is also desirable to test for such breaks more formally.  The approach we 
take first of all relies less on identifying structural breaks rather than detecting 
unusually influential observations.  First we introduce some necessary notation.  This 
involves concepts and measures which are familiar in regression analysis except that 
here they are applied to individual observations as opposed to the regression as a 
whole. 
Suppose we have an estimated regression model of the form  e Xb y + =  where 
y is a  1 × n  vector, X is an  k n×  matrix and b is a  1 × k  vector of estimated 
coefficients with e the vector of residuals.  Thus we have n observations and k 
independent variables (including the intercept, if any).   j x  represents the jth 
observation,  j y  is the observed value of the dependent variable with predicted value 
b x y j j = ˆ .  The residuals are defined as  j j j y y e ˆ ˆ − =  and 
2 s  is the mean square error 
of the regression.  We also write 
1 2 ) (
− ′ = X X s V .   
We define a diagonal element of the projection matrix,  j h , as 
j j j x X X x h ′ ′ =
−1 ) ( .  The standard error of the prediction for observation j is defined as 
j j p x V x s
j ′ =  which can also be expressed as  j p h s s
j = .  The standard error of the 
                                                 
1 In January 2002 Ireland, along with a number of other nations in the EU, adopted the euro as its 
currency.  This led to many prices being “rounded” up or down.  A rounding up of doctors’ fees seems 
to be a plausible explanation for the relatively sharp rise observed in 2002 Q1.   6
forecast is defined as  j f h s s
j + = 1  while the standard error of the residual is 
j r h s s
j − = 1 .  Standardised residuals are defined as 













.  In the latter expression  ) ( j s represents the root mean 
square error with the jth observation removed.  We are now in a position to explain 
the various statistics used to detect unusually influential observations. 
Following the discussion in Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980) we can think in 
terms of three key issues in identifying model sensitivity to individual observations.  
These are residuals, leverage and influence.  Taking residuals first, each individual 
residual  j j j y y e ˆ ˆ − =  tells us how much the fitted value of the dependent variable 
differs from the observed value.  Any given data point  ) , ( j j y x  with a large residual is 
an outlier and clearly there is concern that such outliers will exert undue influence 
upon estimated coefficients. 
However, large residuals are not the only way in which individual points can 
affect estimates unduly.  In the same way that  j y  and  j y ˆ  can be far apart it is also 
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Suppose we have a scatterplot of y against x such that all points are located in a mass 
concentrated in the ellipse in the lower left side of the diagram, apart from a single 
point (xj, yj) in the top right-hand corner.  The dashed line shows the estimated 
regression line obtained, which clearly comes very close to the point (xj, yj).  Thus (xj, 
yj) is not an outlier in the sense of having a large residual, yet it has a dramatic effect 
on the estimated slope of the regression line, since if this point was deleted then the 
estimates would change markedly.  The point (xj, yj) is said to have high leverage and 
it would be reflected in a high value of hj. 
  Thus we can think of influence being exerted in two ways, via large residuals 
or a high degree of leverage.  We now introduce a number of statistics which can 
combine both notions and give us some idea of the degree of influence of each 
observation.  The different statistics will reflect different types of influence e.g. with 
regard to the estimated coefficient b, or perhaps the standard error of b. 
  The first measures we will examine, apart from the plot of residuals, will be 
the measures of leverage, hj, and the standardised and studentised residuals defined 
earlier.  From the expression above it is clear that the standardised errors are simply 
the residuals adjusted for their standard errors.  Standardised residuals adjust using the 
root mean square error while studentised errors adjust using the root mean square 
error of a regression omitting the observation in question.  Belsley, Kuh and Welsch 
(1980) state that studentised residuals can be interpreted as the t statistic for testing 
the significance of a dummy variable equal to 1 in the observation in question and 0 
elsewhere, since such a variable would effectively absorb the observation and so 
remove its influence upon determining the other coefficients in the model.   8
  A very direct measure of the influence of a single observation is provided by 
the DFBETA statistic.  This measure focuses on one particular regression coefficient 
and measures the difference between that coefficient when the jth observation is 
included and excluded, with the difference being scaled by the estimated standard 
error of the coefficient.  Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980) suggest a critical value of  
n DFBETAj / 2 > , while it is also common practice to simply use 1 i.e. the 
observation shifted the estimate by one standard error. 
  The next three statistics are attempts to create an index which is affected by 
the size of the residuals and the degree of leverage and as they are related we will deal 
with them together.  The first of these is the DFITS measure (Welsch and Kuh, 1977) 









 where rj are the studentised residuals.  Thus 
large values of the residuals will increase the DFITS measure as will large values of 
hj.  Intuitively, DFITS is a measure of the difference between predicted values for the 
jth case when the regression is estimated with and without the jth observation. 
  Following from the DFITS measure we have Cook’s Distance (Cook, 1977) 











D =  with k  the number of independent variables, 
including the constant, s the root mean square error of the regression and s(j) the root 
mean square error when the jth observation is omitted.  Thus Cook’s Distance is a 
measure of the difference between the coefficient vectors when the jth observation is 
omitted.   9











n is the total number of observations.  Thus Welsch’s Distance involves another 
normalisation by leverage apart from that already embodied in the DFITS measure. 
  Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980) suggest a critical value of DFITS of  n k / 2,  
suggesting threshold values of Cook’s and Welsch’s Distance of 4/n and  k 3  
respectively. 
The final statistic we consider addresses the influence of individual observations 
on the variance-covariance matrix of the estimates.  The measure is the ratio of the 




























j s e is the standardised residual.   





1 ≥ − . 
  An alternative approach to searching for unusually influential observations is 
to examine the data for a structural shift in the estimated relationship.  Perhaps the 
best known of such tests is the Chow test.  Suppose we have an idea of where the 
structural shift takes place.  The model is then estimated before and after the supposed 
structural shift and an F test can then be carried out on whether the estimated 
relationship is the “same” before and after the supposed shift.  Suppose there are n1 
observations before the structural shift and n2 observations following the structural 
shift.  Let S1 represent the residual sum of squares for the regression estimated on all 
the observations and let S2 and S3 represent the residual sum of squares for the 
regression run on the n1 and n2 observations respectively.  Then if there are k 
parameters to be estimated the statistic    10
) 2 /( ) (
/ ) (
2 1 3 2
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follows an F distribution with degrees of freedom (k, n1+n2-2k). 
  As we will see below however, a problem with the Chow test is that while it 
can tell whether the relationship has changed for two different periods with the cut-off 
date chosen arbitrarily, it does not identify when exactly the relationship begins to 
change. 
A potentially more useful approach is to examine the recursive residuals from the 
regression (see Brown et al., 1975, and Galpin and Hawkins, 1980).  These residuals 
are not unlike the studentised residuals mentioned above.  Suppose our data consists 
of n observations.  Then discard the last data point and estimate the model using the 
first n-1 observations.  We can denote vector of estimated coefficients as bn-1.  The 
recursive residual, denoted by wn-1 is then defined as the standardised residual of the 
last observation from the new line, being standardised by the variance σ
2.  The 
procedure can then be carried out for the second last point as well and the regression 
fitted to the first n-2 points giving wn-2.  By continually omitting points in this way n-p 
recursive residuals can be calculated, assuming we are trying to estimate p 
parameters. 
The examination of plots of the recursive residuals can be extremely useful in 
detecting a “change in regime” in the regression model.  As Brown et al. (1975) point 
out  “...the recursive residuals seem preferable [to other transformations of least-
squares residuals] for detecting the change of a model over time since until a change 
takes place the recursive residuals behave exactly as on the null hypothesis” (Brown 
et al., 1975, p. 150).  Brown et al. suggest plotting the cumulative sums (CUSUM) of 










, where i can take on values from 1 to   11
n-p.  If all the regression assumptions are satisfied then the plot of zi should be a 
random walk within a parabolic envelope (where the borders of the envelope can 
reflect significance levels) about the origin since the expectation of these recursive 










When a structural break occurs, we typically observe a secular increase (or decrease) 
in zi.  In the illustration above we show recursive residuals for two regressions, with 
the dashed line showing no signs of a structural break, while the constant line shows 
clear signs. 
  Complementary to the CUSUM plot is that of the CUSUM of squares.  This 

















, i=p+1, p+2,…,n.  Brown et al. claim that this plot is 
particularly useful when departures from constancy of the bi is “…haphazard rather 
than systematic” (Brown et al., 1975, p. 154).  Once again if the regression 
assumptions are satisfied then these quantities should stay within defined limits.   




Structural Break   12
not showing stability.  Note that as we plot this statistic from observation p+1 to 












3.  Results 
We now present values of the above statistics for influential observations and for 
structural breaks for the case of doctors’ fees.  We are concerned only with the pure 
time-series properties of doctors’ fees, hence our regression model will only have 
time and higher order terms in time as explanatory variables.  Ideally we would like to 
estimate a structural or even reduced form of inverse demand function whereby 
doctors’ fees would depend upon such factors as underlying health, supply of GPs etc.  
Such data is simply not available and so we concentrate purely on the time series 
properties of doctors’ fees. 
There are a variety of models we could estimate to investigate the pure time-series 
properties of doctors’ fees.  Perhaps the simplest is where we simply let doctors’ fees 
depend upon an n-th order polynomial in time.  For comparison we include results for 
1% significance 
line 
1% significance line 
Observation number 
CUSUMSQ   13
a quadratic, cubic and quartic in time.  For the case of leverage, standardised residuals 
and studentised residuals we present those observations with the five highest values.  
For the other statistics outlined above we list those observations in excess of the 
critical values suggested by Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980). 
The results for influential observations do not lend any support to the idea that 
1989 is in any way “different” in the sense that the relationship between doctors’ fees 
and time is unduly influenced by events in this year.  In no case does an observation 
from 1989 exceed the critical value, nor are they ranked high in terms of leverage or 
the standardised or studentised residuals.  What is of interest is to examine what 
observations, if any, consistently appear to be influential.  In terms of residuals, it is 
clear that the first two quarters of 2002 and, to a lesser extent, of 1994 are outliers.  
As suggested above, the behaviour of doctors’ fees in early 2002 is probably due to 
rounding up following the introduction of the euro.  It is less clear what caused the 
higher residuals in 1994. 
In terms of leverage, the greatest influence is exerted by observations at the 
beginning and end of the sample period.  In the case of the various measures 
combining residuals and leverage, the influence of large outliers appears to dominate 
that of observations with high leverage.  Hence 2002 Q1 has the highest value of 
DFITS, Cook’s and Welsch’s Distance.  For COVRATIO it is generally those 
observations with highest leverage which exert the most influence. 
Turning now to the results for structural breaks, when we calculate the Chow 
statistic above for the quadratic, cubic and quartic in time for our data using 1989 Q1 
as the date for the structural shift we obtain F values of  125.74, 117.24 and 100.01 
respectively, clearly rejecting the null hypothesis that there is no structural shift.  So, 
is this clear evidence that doctors’ fees did take a jump in 1989?  Not really, since if   14
we calculate the same statistic for different dates, chosen somewhat randomly, then 
we also obtain high F values.  For example, choosing 1986 Q1 we obtain F values of 
129.19, 119.41 and 96.74 respectively, while choosing 1995 Q1 we obtain 97.63, 
78.57 and 79.48.  Thus while the Chow Test can tell whether the relationship has 
changed for two different periods with the cut-off date chosen arbitrarily, it does not 
identify when exactly the relationship begins to change. 
In figures 1a to 4b we present the plots of the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ for the 
different regression models estimated for doctors’ fees, while in table 3 we show for 
what quarter, if any, the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ plots move outside the 95% 
confidence intervals and for what quarter, if any, they move back inside the limits.  
The results for CUSUM show no consistency in terms of when a regime change 
may have occurred.  Those for CUSUMSQ do show consistency, with evidence of a 
change in regime sometime in 1988.  This, however, pre-dates the change in 
reimbursement so unless GPs were demonstrating an unusual degree of foresight it 
seems unlikely that the change in reimbursement was the source of this regime 
change. 
 
4.  Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper has extended the analysis of MNN’s investigation into the presence of 
supplier induced demand in the Irish health system.  An analysis of the time-series 
properties of doctors’ fees gave no indication that there was any unusual upwards 
“blip” around about the time the reimbursement change was introduced in 1989.  This 
finding is consistent with the conclusions of MNN who had used the reimbursement 
change as a natural experiment in their investigation into the presence of supplier 
induced demand in the Irish health system and concluded that no such inducement   15
existed.  The analysis concludes that to the extent that any period could be identified 
where doctors fees did appear to behave unusually it was 2002 Q1, the period when 
the changeover to the euro occurred and when there was some anecdotal evidence of 
prices being rounded up.   16
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Table 1: Residuals and Leverage Tables 
 Quadratic  Cubic  Quartic 
Residual    1993q3   4.040937 
  1994q2   4.075958 
 1994q1    4.41813 
  2002q2   5.803434 
  2002q1   11.10708 
  1983q1   4.159307 
  1994q2   4.314041 
  1994q1   4.597921 
  2002q2   5.249311 
  2002q1   10.71379 
  1994q2   3.326477 
  1994q1   3.566862 
  2001q4   4.052376 
  2002q2   5.156991 
  2002q1   10.93967 
Leverage    1983q3   .0849845 
  2003q2   .0937705 
  1983q2   .0937705 
  2003q3   .1033715 
  1983q1   .1033715 
  2003q1   .1224355 
  2003q2   .1469544 
  1983q2   .1469544 
  2003q3   .1763529 
  1983q1   .1763529 
  2003q1   .1472167 
  2003q2   .1956615 
  1983q2   .1956646 
  2003q3   .2615539 
  1983q1    .261558 
Standardised 
Residual 
  1993q3   1.614895 
  1994q2   1.628505 
  1994q1   1.765409 
  2002q2   2.363393 
  2002q1   4.508962 
  1994q2   1.772296 
   1983q1   1.855927 
   1994q1   1.888412 
   2002q2   2.207103 
  2002q1    4.47928 
   1994q2   1.491997 
   1994q1   1.600324 
   2001q4   1.832766 
   2002q2   2.352024 
   2002q1   4.962735 
Studentised  
Residual 
  1993q3   1.631584 
  1994q2   1.645804 
  1994q1   1.789546 
  2002q2   2.435124 
  2002q1   5.188176 
   1994q2   1.797132 
   1983q1   1.885711 
   1994q1   1.920263 
   2002q2   2.264002 
   2002q1   5.153057 
   1994q2   1.504019 
   1994q1   1.616797 
   2001q4   1.861503 
   2002q2   2.424454 
   2002q1   5.960912 
   19
 
Table 2: DFITS, Cook’s Distance, Welsch’s Distance and COVRATIO Tables 
 Quadratic  Cubic  Quartic 
DFITS     2002q3   .4173948 
   2002q2   .6319016 
   2002q1   1.277219 
  1983q2   .4850934 
  1983q1   .8725609 
  2002q2   .6323084 
  2002q1   1.322664 
   1983q1     .48272 
     2001q4   .4566158 
    2002q2   .6776755 
    2002q1   1.538692 
Cook’s 
Distance 
  2002q3   .0571261 
  2002q2   .1253739 
  2002q1   .4107081 
  2003q2   .0896757 
  2003q3   .0493738 
  1983q2   .0585576 
  1983q1   .1843755 
  2002q2   .0949926 
   2002q1   .3304649 
    2003q2   .3196336 
    2003q3   .4125764 
    2003q1    .061532 
     2002q2   .0864429 
     2002q1   .3282086 
Welsch’s 
Distance 
 2002q2    5.91163 
  2002q1   11.91102 
   1983q1   8.706269 
    2002q1   12.36548 
   2002q2    6.37183 
    2002q1   14.39016 
DFBETA (q)    2002q1  -.6726409 
  2002q2  -.3538598 
  1994q1   .2204721 
  2002q3  -.2464218 
             1983q1  -.2877555 
    2002q1   .2896095 
    1998q3   .2200425 
     1983q1  -.6140192 
     2003q2  -.3263205 
    1983q2  -.3218166 
    2003q3  -.2590429 
   2003q2   .5760458 
    2003q3   .7550463 
     1983q1  -.3070806 
 
DFBETA (q
2)   2002q1   .7438254 
 2002q2   .3884256 
 2002q3   .2688075 
 1983q1   .2713457 
   2002q1  -.3240395 
    1998q3  -.2253262 
   1983q1   .5864317 
   2003q2   .3441555 
   1983q2   .3060353 
   2003q3   .2721687 
   2003q2  -.6012018 
   2003q3  -.7846808 
   1983q1   .2958201 
DFBETA (q
3)       2002q1   .3635265 
   2002q2   .2263039 
   1998q3   .2283469 
   1983q1  -.5613201 
   2003q2  -.3628275 
   1983q2  -.2918263 
   2003q3  -.2857441 
  2003q2   .6275222 
   2003q3   .8152993 
   1983q1  -.2853069 
DFBETA (q
4)        2003q2  -.6548761 
  2003q3  -.8466979 
  2003q1  -.2287365 
  1983q1   .2755144 
COVRATIO   1983q4   1.124759 
 1983q2   1.132886 
 2003q1   1.134225 
 1983q3   1.134871 
 2003q3   1.155496 
   2002q1   .3474203 
   1983q2   1.150797 
   1983q4   1.166584 
   2002q4   1.171982 
   2003q1   1.176337 
   1983q3   1.186772 
   2003q3   1.218951 
   2002q1   .1706468 
   2002q2   .7960646 
   2003q2   .8541124 
  1984q1    1.16814 
   2002q4   1.186107 
   1983q4   1.201302 
   1983q3   1.248664 
   1983q2   1.315668 
   1983q1   1.384297 
  
Table 3: “Break-Out” Quarters for Doctors’ Fees 
Break Out Quarters 
 Linear  Quadratic  Cubic  Quartic 
CUSUM  1993 q2  1997 q4  2001 q4  - 
CUSUMSQ  1988 q1  1988 q2  1988 q2  1988 q3 
 
Break In Quarters 
 Linear  Quadratic  Cubic  Quartic 
CUSUM -  1999  q3  -  - 
CUSUMSQ  2002 q2  2002 q1  2002 q1  2003 q1   21
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Figure 4b:  CUSUMSQ plot for quartic regression against time 
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